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Abstract
Petraeus-gate, hacked nude celebrity photos in the cloud and the recent use of a search and seizure
warrant in the United States of America to seek production of customer email contents on an
extraterritorial server raises important issues for the supposably safe storage of data on the World
Wide Web. Not only may there be nowhere to hide in cyberspace but nothing in cyberspace may be
private. This paper explores the legal and technical issues raised by the these matters with emphasis on
the courts decision “In the Matter of a Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and
Maintained by Microsoft Corporation” and the subsequent upholding of that decision in it concludes
with suggestions for ‘safe’ storage of data.
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INTRODUCTION
To Cardinal Richelieu has been attributed the statement ‘Give me six lines written by the hand of the
most honest man, I will find something in them which will hang him’. Recent events suggest Internet
users might sear those words into their subconscious as they enter cyberspace. Complacency in webuse exposes web users to additional risks in a highly security conscious environment. Recent examples
include revelations that nude photos stored in the Cloud (Stuart, 2014) have been the subject of a
successful targeted hack despite assumed secure storage (Rushe, 2014) while General Petraeus failed
to hide his ‘personal love affair’ whilst using the web and lost his job. The Petraeus and nude photo
matters highlight the current risks associated with Internet use. These are not isolated cases. The BBC
(2009) reported on thirteen cases (between 2007-2009) of data loss of medical records, prisoner records
and defence personnel records. Recent events such as the aforementioned, suggest that the problem
still exists. The web is also an increasingly valuable source of information for security agencies driven
by the realisation that traditional jurisdictional limitations may not apply to data on the web as the
nature of electronic data allows existing legal tools to defeat anonymity and confidentiality. The recent
decision In the Matter of a Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by
Microsoft Corporation 13 Mag. 2814, hereafter Microsoft E-Mail Case, highlight a new jurisdictional
paradigm while Petraeus-gate demonstrated that even determined attempts at confidentiality can be
overcome by security agencies. In the Microsoft E-Mail Case the judge issued a search warrant
requiring Microsoft in America to produce information stored in Ireland. An appeal has confirmed this
decision. This paper uses a case study, the Microsoft E-Mail Case, to examine legal and technical
issues of privacy and security with respect to storage of information on the Internet. This paper
explores this mélange of law, technology and security concluding with options for ‘safe’ storage of
Internet data.

LEGAL ISSUES
The Microsoft E-Mail Case and subsequent appeals raise important legal issues. Petraeus-gate
demonstrated the ability of security agencies, acting lawfully; to piece together ‘fragments’ of
electronic data to find a source, while the nude photos hack demonstrated that advertised security
measures may not be much help against a determined hacker, possibly raising private legal remedies.
What is clear from these three matters is that what was once private is now no longer private if linked
to the Internet. While determining jurisdiction limitations was a key issue in the Microsoft E-Mail Case
decision other factors worth considering also arose especially as this was one of the few cases that
made it into the public arena (see, for example, Zetter, 2013). Without assessing the contents of such
warrants and the data handed over it is not possible to ascertain whether or not the warrants achieved a
national security purpose.
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While Petraeus-gate raised no jurisdictional issues, the nude photo hack ignores jurisdictional
limitations. But jurisdictional limitations usually apply to the execution of a search and seizure warrant
and that is what makes the Microsoft E-Mail Case important. The hypothetical web-user always faced
the risk that determined security agencies acting legally might access their Internet data. The nude
photos hack tells this same user that commercial security measures may not be adequate. The Microsoft
E-Mail Case tells our user their data may not be safe no matter where it is stored.
Jurisdiction is generally state-based so that a legal instrument issued in the United States of America
(USA) is limited to the territory of the USA. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLAT) provide an
agreed process for service and execution of warrants seeking information from outside a states
jurisdiction. The decision in the Microsoft E-Mail Case stepped around these treaties because the
warrant was served within the USA. The essence of the judgement is that Microsoft is to deliver email
content held in one of its servers in Ireland to a New York Court because the warrant was served on
Microsoft in the USA. Microsoft opposed the warrant because the email content was held in Ireland
while the government argued the warrant required Microsoft to hand over email content no matter
where it was held. At first blush this may not seem unreasonable until it is recognised that the impact of
the judgement means all Internet and cloud companies operating out of America may be required by
the US government to hand over content stored in other jurisdictions.
Judge Francis’s decision turned on the nature of digital information and the impact of a search warrant.
The search warrant required Microsoft to hand the email content over to the American court or breach
American law (see, for example, Carroll, 2014). In complying Microsoft may or may not breach Irish
law, but would almost certainly breach European Union data transfer laws.
This warrant is also jointly covered by various America laws including section 108 of the Patriot Act.
In particular, emphasis was placed on the meaning of the words “where the property is located” being
the location of the ISP, not the location of any server. The warrant shifted the onus on production to
Microsoft. This is because the warrant is a combination of search warrant as usually used in criminal
proceedings and a subpoena, a writ requiring persons or things to be delivered to the court. The warrant
also has inbuilt secrecy provisions unlike traditional search warrants where the occupant is usually
present at the search unlike a hypothetical web-user.
Any assumptions by web users that data were secure and private is meaningless. Stevens (2009) has
blogged on the fallacy that if you have nothing to hide you have nothing to fear. This was demonstrated
when General David Petraeus, former head of the Central Intelligence Agency was forced to resign
after evidence of an extra-marital affair was revealed in emails. What made the Petraeus case
significant is that Petraeus was very, very careful – he had something he wanted to hide and it was not
criminal. It could be inferred he knew about Richelieu. The emails to his lover were never sent. They
were filed in a drafts folder that the lover accessed and read. As such the contents of the emails were
never transmitted so they would be out of reach of any electronic signals eavesdropping agency
(Whittaker, 2012). What undid Petraeus was his lover warning off others via the Internet leading to one
of the receiptants alerting the authorities. Examination of the lover’s emails revealed traces that led to
General Petraeus’s door and he was, figuratively, hung.
In the Microsoft E-Mail Case the nature, size and reach of Microsoft now poses privacy problems for
our hypothetical web-user. Microsoft Corporation is an international company headquartered in the
USA. While Microsoft is generally recognised as a major software developer it also operates a
significant Internet service including email services and data storage. In 2011 Microsoft purchased
Skype. Importantly for the purposes of this paper Microsoft has office locations in some 211 countries.
(http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/worldwide.aspx) Microsoft also has a privacy statement
(http://www.microsoft.com/privacystatement/en-us/core/default.aspx)>) but this may be rendered
useless by the Microsoft E-Mail Case.
It is Microsoft’s activities in cyberspace that are at the centre of the Microsoft E-Mail Case. While
cyberspace may be a construct in the ether it has terrestrial accouchements such as data storage, chat
rooms, files and on-line shops. Users have a digital footprint that can transcend borders. This
borderless nature can mean the host of your email account may be on the other side of the world.. In
Verizon Communications Inc.’s Motion to Participate as Amicus Curiae in Microsoft’s appeal against
the decision in the Microsoft E-Mail Case Vatis and Novack cite Morrison v National Australia Bank
Ltd., 561 US 247, 248; “longstanding principle of American law that legislation of Congress, unless a
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contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States”.
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/r/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2014/06/10/NationalSecurity/Graphics/Verizon%20Amicus%20Brief%20(Final).pdf )
Judge Francis gave greater weight to the necessities of law enforcement over traditional concerns of
jurisdiction and privacy. These concerns were covered in the recently published Australian Law
Reform Commission report on Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era. This report observed
that invasions of digital privacy occur with ‘increasing ease and frequency (17) and ‘personal
information, once put online seems impossible to destroy or forget’ (17). It went on to note that despite
legal protections there are ‘significant inconsistency in the law between jurisdictions’ (26). The report
recommended federal legislation to ensure consistency across Australia (278). Additionally the report
recognised the potential impact of surveillance on important freedoms and liberties (277 per Professor
Neil Richards) noting ‘it can chill the exercise of our civil liberties’ causing people to ‘self adjust their
behaviour even if they are not doing anything wrong’ (277 per Associate Professor Moira Paterson).

TECHNICAL ISSUES
Cloud computing represents a natural evolution of information technology service provision, where
market forces determine the price of the services on offer, thus providing cost-effective services to
customers, without the need for highly-educated on-site personnel required to maintain expensive
equipment. This is perhaps a further stage of the outsourced information technology (IT) model of a
decade ago. As with any new concept, there is often confusion as to what business value “the cloud”
represents and therefore the quantifiable benefits that might accrue from the use of such technology are
unclear. This section presents a definition of cloud computing, displays common cloud architecture and
considers the impact of the need for security and privacy on cloud computing.
Cloud computing, at first glance, appears to be focused on large-scale storage of information, however,
Mell and Grance (2011, p2) provide a succinct definition of cloud computing that encompasses more
than storage, viz: “…a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a
shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and
services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service
provider interaction”.
Vendors of cloud services assert that costs are lower than conventional models of IT provision, as low
as 12 cents per Gb of storage per month, for example (RackSpace, personal communication, August
2014). Mason (2011) presents a contrasting view and asserts that a more traditional model of data
storage is more cost effective. However, cost is not, and should not, be the sole driver. Security of
intellectual property and the need to keep valuable business data private are also key objectives for
most firms, should they wish to keep their hard-won market share. The well-documented recent case
of the MineLab metal detectors (Fowler, 2013) where the firm found their product had been copied and
was being sold without their knowledge serves to highlight the seriousness of the problem.
The need for security and privacy is made more difficult as noted by Shostack and Stewart (2008), who
claim that most software is insecure “because security is difficult for prospective customers to evaluate,
it is rarely prioritized above other factors in their purchasing process” (Shostack and Stewart, 2008,
p89). This would likely be multiplied as the environment in which the software operates (e.g., cloud
computing) becomes more complex. Put another way, Johnstone (2009) notes that the lack of security
in software is due to the tension between function (as seen by a customer) and security (which often is
invisible). As software becomes ubiquitous, this reliance on software that may be insecure raises
concerns in terms of business continuity.
Confidentiality is considered a core principle of information security. Confidentiality in a cloud-based
system is maintained in two ways. First, a user of cloud services does not know which physical location
stores the data and second, the data may be split into several parts across several locations. Thus the
appearance of a single file as a user view is preserved by the cloud façade as part of “software as a
service”. This describes the scenario where all of the cloud service layers function flawlessly to
provide the expected (paid for) services. How would an attack on confidentiality affect the provision of
cloud services? There may be an opportunity for data to be modified or leaked (a breach of
confidentiality) because of a failure in the other service provision layers.
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These issues are further complicated because the attacks can be launched by disgruntled employees,
lone hackers, activist groups, business competitors or nation-states. Much of the software required for
these attacks is freely available. This suggests that businesses need the freedom to protect their
information assets from others with appropriate security and privacy measures if they wish to have
control over their intellectual property.
The metadata retention proposal by the Australian Government (Bergin, 2014), whilst viewed with
dismay by telecommunications providers may not be completely anathema. Telstra, at least, did not
see a problem with the proposal. The claim that Microsoft read the email of one of its Hotmail
customers for its own purposes certainly muddies the waters (Hern, 2014) and the Preska decision (on
the 31st of July, 2014) against Microsoft has not increased business confidence in technology,
especially cloud-based services that are outside of a firm’s locus of control, especially given that many
email and cloud providers host services physically on the west coast of the USA.
How then, may firms operate in cyberspace whilst preserving privacy and ensuring that security is
maintained? Assuming that no data will travel through a satellite office within the jurisdiction of the
USA, the obvious option is a cryptographic method such that encrypting is easy but decrypting without
the appropriate key is computationally infeasible. As mentioned previously, confidentiality is a core
tenet of information security. The metadata retention proposal and the action by Microsoft present two
different problems. The former, one of tracking where someone has been (potentially an attack on
privacy), the latter an attack on confidentiality. Metadata retention is perhaps less of a problem for
businesses as this may show what web site was visited by an employee, but not what s/he did whilst
there. This leaves the latter, more serious problem, of assuring confidentiality.
A conventional approach to guaranteeing confidentiality involves encrypting the data at the source and
decrypting it at the destination. This is commonly done with asymmetric encryption, where two keys
are generated, a private key (held securely by the destination) and a public key (made available to
anyone). If the keys are large enough, it can take a long time (months or years) for the encryption to be
broken by a third party. Given that information has a time value, this is a reasonable trade-off.
Are there any issues with this scheme? The keys must be related to large prime numbers. It takes time
to find large (relatively) prime numbers. By large, we mean hundreds of decimal digits. It is obvious
by inspection that 11 is a prime number as it has no factors other than 1 and itself. What about
524,287? How easy would it be to confirm that this number has no factors apart from 1 and itself?
Kleinjung et al. (2010) report being able to determine the primes within a 768-bit (232 digit) number
using several hundred computers over two years. It also takes time to encrypt and decrypt messages.
Ultimately, the users must decide the trade-off between time/security and convenience.

DISCUSSION
Davidson argues that the rules needed for cyberspace cannot be based upon the rule of law
notwithstanding the parallels. (Davidson, 2009, 16) This is because the ‘rule of cyberspace is the
natural, emergent order arising from data chaos’. (Davidson, 18) Information in cyberspace has
different values to different people with cyberspace providing freedom and order for users. (Davidson,
23) Davidson believes any attempt to control cyberspace will fail because of the special ability of
cyberspace. (Davidson, 24)
Microsoft’s failure to date in its challenge of the warrant pose serious risks to individual privacy and
serious commercial risks for Microsoft. Whether or not Microsoft wins US security agencies have
forced businesses to review security and privacy arrangements. Carroll (2014) has reported that the
German government has ‘told Microsoft it will shun data storage from US companies unless the ruling
is overturned’. Foreign users and domestic Americans may well join the Germans and stop using
American Internet services, a move that could impact adversely on profit margins. Of more direct
concern for American users is that other States may adopt the same tactics including use of similar
warrants served on Microsoft in their jurisdiction requiring Microsoft to hand over details of
Americans stored in the USA.
When you add the particular features of Petraeus-gate and the nude celebrity photo hack to the mélange
of law, technology and security surrounding so-called ‘safe’ storage and assumptions by our
hypothetical web-user nothing seems really secure. If the Microsoft E-Mail Case had not made the
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news, had Microsoft not challenged but rather complied with the warrant email users would be none
the wiser that maybe their email content stored outside of the USA can be easily accessed without their
knowledge by American security agencies. Petraeus-gate tells us that these same agencies can with the
tools available legally find you even if you want to stay private while the nude celebrity photo hack
poses the question, how secure is secure?

Is anywhere, any method of storage safe?
Given the scenarios described above, is the only safe computer one that is not connected to the Internet
(and is turned off and stored in a locked safe)? The unfortunate answer is “it depends”. Before
deciding the question, the pertinent sub-questions to ask are: From whom must the data be protected
and for how long? This will depend on the nature of the data and who has control over these data.

For the user whose data must be kept secure and private for legal reasons (e.g., medical records), the
answer possibly lies in homomorphic encryption schemes. Usually, when encrypted data needs to be
processed, it must first be decrypted, then processed, then finally re-encrypted. This could lead to a
potential breach of confidentiality as remnants of the unencrypted data may be stored in an insecure
place (e.g. a temporary file on a local computer). Homomorphic encryption offers a way to be able to
process data in its encrypted form without the need for decryption, thus confidentiality is maintained.
Ultimately, in the security chain, it is the human element that is the weakest link as demonstrated in
Petraeus-gate. Wikileaks and the Snowden case (Sifry, 2011) also provide strong evidence towards
this assertion. Strong encryption is useless if the password is written on a post-it note stuck to a user’s
monitor screen. Similarly, a large private key stored on a computer accessible via the Internet is a
breach waiting to occur.

CONCLUSION
This paper examined some legal and technical issues pertaining to the right to privacy, with particular
reference to the Microsoft case. Recall that the impact of the judgement means all Internet and cloud
companies operating out of America may be required by the US government to hand over content
stored in other jurisdictions (states). This poses a resultant risk to business viability as increased
security will drive up client costs. Others businesses will go underground. Some business clients will
want change so as not to be hung by Richelieu. There is the potential for increased cyber conflict as
other nation states copy the actions of US security agencies.
The technical means of preserving privacy also proved to be potentially inadequate, depending on the
trade-off between ease-of-use and security. Even if users preferred data security over ease-of-use, the
legal issues raised above make any strong encryption a moot point if a user can be compelled to hand
over the decryption key. Further, the future realisation of quantum computing would render such largekey encryption schemes almost instantly breakable (Rich and Gellman, 2014).
Perhaps the final words belong to a cryptographer. They describe how technology was initially hailed
as the saviour of privacy, but some critical self-reflection over time declares otherwise. “It is
insufficient to protect ourselves with laws; we need to protect ourselves with mathematics” (Schneier,
1996). His view changed somewhat five years later. “It’s just not true. Cryptography can’t do any of
that.” (Schneier, 2000).
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